In his book The Art of the Soluble, Peter Medawar states that to students of the 1930s "… experimental embryology was the subject that seemed most exciting, … that most nearly on the threshold of a grand revelation." Much of the excitement was due to the discovery of embryonic induction by Hans Spemann and Hilde Mangold, which promised to reveal not only how embryos are made but the nature of molecular instruction itself. The task proved hard, however, and Medawar opted for immunology -brilliantly as it turned out -complaining that despite the exactitude ("even punctilio") of descriptive embryology, it wouldn't get far without genetics and a theory to account for it.
If revelations are the point of science, the more recent unravelling of the molecular genetic mechanisms that pattern fruit fly development must rank high in grandeur. By the early 1980s, when I had been working on regeneration in the vertebrate nervous system, development was becoming increasingly fascinating and the time seemed ripe for looking at largescale, segmental (metameric) patterning in vertebrate embryos. Just the kind of thing, you might think, that would have been sorted out years ago by biologists and their light microscopes, but a chance encounter in the departmental library with a 1933 paper by George Streeter [1] entirely changed my preconceptions.
He had called it "The status of metamerism in the central nervous system of chick embryos," and the fact that there was any question about metamerism in vertebrate embryos was remarkable enough. As I read on, it was easy to see that here was an eloquent attempt at the last word on a subject that had exercised the nervous systems of previous generations to the point of passion.
The paper was essentially a demolition job, and not the first in the field. In 1858, T.H. Huxley famously shattered Goethe's segmented vertebrate skull, but within 40 years segmentation had been resurrected with full force by comparative embryologists, this time to include the central nervous system (CNS).
The chief object of Streeter's contempt was Charles Hill, who "… apparently intoxicated by the simplification of the mechanics of development that seemed to be offered by the principle of metamerism" had the temerity to suggest that the vertebrate CNS is metameric in origin "from stem to stern." Hill's drawings, Streeter cynically declared, illustrated neural segmentation "… with great daring," his "evanescent segments" had been far too influential, and that to draw "rigid geometrical" lines across the developing brain where they did not exist was nothing short of "an act of rank pedagogic violence." Instead, Streeter insisted simply, neural segments "… are not justified by the available evidence" -which included his own detailed observations -and that to pronounce otherwise was "to lean more toward the principles of the tailor shop than toward those typical of living embryonic tissue." He did somewhat grudgingly admit that his anti-metamerism should perhaps be qualified in the case of the hindbrain -to me so impressively segmented from even a glance down the microscope at a living chick embryo -but in his main conclusion he took the extreme view.
To someone schooled in the unshakeable certainties of anatomical description, in the belief that the punctilio of vertebrate development had been worked over with such accuracy that all dissent had been extinguished, this was heady stuff. Here, it seemed, was the reason why the field had remained essentially inactive for the next 50 years, as if dealt a mortal blow by Streeter's paper. But at least the whole business of segmentation in the nervous system had mattered once and could therefore matter once more, and so I was motivated. It was plain that there was plenty left to do, that the striking segmental patterns so visible in the nervous system of living chicks were more than dead ducks and should be looked at again.
